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We describe a set of Network Flight Recorder scripts designed to detect network intru-
sions. After developing scripts that detect some known attacks, we focus on sifting
scripts that attempt to remove "normal" traffic from a packet stream, leaving behind
fewer packets requiring manual inspection. We conclude with a description of our
experiences with the NFR product.
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Passive protocol analysis is useful in detecting
attacks on networked machines. Known attacks
can be detected directly by looking for them in
the network packet stream, using a network moni-
toring protocol analysis engine to look for unique
bit patterns or sequences of packets unique to
such attacks. Unknown attacks can be detected
indirectly by separating for manual analysis
suspicious traffic from traffic generated by cus-
tomary network applications. For example,
artificially fragmented packets, out-of-order TCP
segments, overlapping segments, and packets
containing incorrectly presented options generally
do not occur during "normal" operations. A pro-
tocol analysis engine that sifts such "suspicious"
packets from the network for manual inspection,
eliding the normal traffic, is successful if the
majority of network traffic is normal.
Filters for known attacks are useful in today’s
environment of widely-distributed attack scripts
for rapidly identifying the existence of an attack
and narrowing the space an administrator must
examine before coping with the attack. For
example, even if source addresses are forged,
knowing that a "Ping of Death" attack is occur-
ring allows an administrator to filter all ICMP
echo request packets at the firewall for some
period of time, or provide cumulative evidence
that pings should be filtered permanently.
In this work we describe a protocol analysis
engine both to detect known attacks and to sift the
packet stream for suspicious traffic. We have
selected the Network Flight Recorder [1] as a
suitable development base, since it possesses an
expressive scripting language, runs on UNIX
platforms, and is available in source code form.
Ptacek and Newsham point out flaws in passive
protocol analysis that can force a network moni-
toring machine to see packets that other hosts on
the same network do not, prevent a network mon-
itor from seeing traffic directed at other hosts, or
attack a network monitor directly [2]. Neverthe-
less, we believe a protocol analysis engine is use-
ful, within the limitations they outline, as their
attacks are not as well-known as and are harder to
construct than the attacks being monitored, partic-
ularly when faced with multiple analysis engines
running on different operating system platforms.
OVERVIEW OF NFR
NFR consists of a number of components, each
responsible for a specific activity:
g Packet suckers capture packets from the net-
work interface.
g A decision engine, written in the N-code
scripting language, checks packets against a
list of filters.
g Backends forward selected packets to storage
or statistical processing.
g A query interface permits examination of
stored data.
NFR is a multi-purpose network monitoring tool,
usable for intrusion detection, usage analysis, and
troubleshooting by system administrators and the
hacker community alike. The interpreted N-code
language allows a user to write arbitrarily com-
plex scripts for analyzing incoming packets, lim-
ited only by the timing constraints imposed by the
NFR engine to ensure that filters share system
resources fairly. To ease the task of the script
writer, the N-code language includes primitives
for analyzing packet header and data fields, and
the NFR engine supports internal operations such
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as TCP reassembly. Functions called within the
scripts pipe data to user specified backend data-
bases. The graphical query interface uses HTML
and Java to query these databases. Summarizing
the NFR data flow, network packets are captured,
N-code scripts are applied, and script outputs are
sent to backends for storage and other processing.
NFR Testbed
We constructed an intrusion detection testbed,
consisting of a 90 Mhz Pentium with 32 MB
RAM, 1.2 GB disk, and a 3Com 3C509 Ethernet
card connected to the CITI production network
via a switch port configured to monitor all net-
work packets.
After some initial problems with the NFR
development version running on OpenBSD 2.2,
we settled on running the 1.6.2 release of NFR on
FreeBSD 2.2.6-RELEASE. Along the way we
identified an error in the development version,
which we passed along to NFR, Inc.
KNOWN-ATTACK SCRIPTS
After coordinating with NFR, Inc. staff to avoid
duplication of effort, we wrote five known-attack
scripts. The scripts themselves contain more
detailed commentary. See Appendix A.
Smurf attack
This filter originated as a vehicle for learning how
to write N-code. The filter detects the classic
Smurf attack, looking for ICMP echo request
packets destined for the broadcast address of a
network. A known filter already detects Smurf-
like attacks, but ours limits itself to ICMP echo to
generate fewer false positives.
Sendmail
This filter looks for attempted and established
connections on the SMTP port of machines on the
local network whose IP addresses are not
enumerated in the filter as legitimate mail servers.
This filter thus detects both sendmail port scans
and unexpected mail servers; we found such a
server on our network. This filter is easily
changed to monitor other ports.
Buffer Overflow
This filter looks for a specific pattern in all packet
payloads going to a specified port. The current
implementation detects a buffer overflow attack
against named in Linux and FreeBSD. This
filter can form the basis for general pattern
matching within a packet.
Teardrop
This filter detects the Teardrop attack, looking for
overlap in a collection of fragmented TCP pack-
ets. The obvious choice of data structure, a list of
lists, is not supported by NFR, requiring us to
carve up a single array manually. Our solution
collects fragmented packets and uses fragment
offsets and lengths to check for overlaps; a
timeout discards older fragments to limit memory
consumption. We collect packets as they arrive
and process collected packets periodically; we
have not compared this to an implementation that
processes each packet as it arrives.
Profiler
We developed a profiling filter to categorize IP
traffic. ICMP packets are counted by type; TCP
and UDP packets are counted by port. NFR’s
associative arrays are useful here. This filter
gives us a rough characterization of network
traffic and helps focus our attention on traffic
appropriate to the sifting work. As an immediate
result, we observed that CITI has made a lot of
progress in replacing telnet with ssh.
The above scripts were running intermittently
against CITI’s network traffic over a period of
several weeks. Attack programs were used to
verify correct filter behavior.
SIFTING SCRIPTS
Here we concentrate on separating suspicious
traffic from ordinary traffic. Our strategy is to
observe a given stream (say, DNS traffic) for a
period of time to note "normal" behavior, say a
stream of "A" requests and responses, then write
NFR scripts to filter out packets corresponding to
this behavior. Playing network traffic through
such a filter reduces its volume by suppressing
normal traffic to leave "suspicious" traffic behind
for manual inspection. This sifting strategy is




Initially, we based our selection on protocols for
which our profiling filter measured high counts.
Unfortunately, some of those (ssh and tel-
net) defy sifting, and we chose not to inspect
others (SMTP) for privacy reasons. Instead, we
focused on protocols that have recognizable nor-
mal behavior: DNS, FTP, and HTTP. See
Appendix B for script listings.
Tcpdump
We wrote an NFR backend that accepts packets
from the decision engine and writes them to a log
file in tcpdump format. This permits other
tools, such as tcpdump or tcptrace [3], to
post-process NFR output. It also permits the out-
put of one NFR engine to feed the input of
another, which we want to explore further.
We wrote a version of this backend that accepts
blocks of packets, which permits N-code scripts
to accumulate packet streams before writing them
out, in those cases where packets must be accu-
mulated before the decision to log them can be
made.
DNS
Using our tcpdump backend, we wrote a filter
that sifts DNS packets and retains suspicious
packets in a log for subsequent inspection. The
script inspects A, PTR, and MX requests. It logs
packets that contain names that are too long, have
too many labels, odd options, or an excessive
number of records. DNS requests other than
these are also logged.
With this simple filter we are able to remove over
90% of all DNS traffic, sifting out 61,092 of
67,048 packets seen in a testing period conducted
27-28 August 1998.
FTP
This filter examines the FTP control stream for
normal commands and begins logging the control
and the associated data stream if suspicious com-
mands are seen. Control streams are buffered so
that normal commands preceding a suspicious
command are logged.
A command found in the stream is first matched
with a short list of normal commands, e.g. CDUP
or PWD, and discarded if found. Then the argu-
ments and argument lengths are checked, with
some combinations flagged as suspicious, such as
RETR /etc/passwd. Along the way, exces-
sively long commands or those containing control
characters are also flagged as suspicious.
With this filter we are able to remove about 25%
of the packets from the control stream, sifting out
1,059 of 4,193 packets seen during the two-day
period. Our filter does not keep enough state to
allow the number of sifted data packets to be cal-
culated. Adding MACB† to the list of normal
commands improved the sifting rate to 80% in a
small sample of 274 control packets.
These results are somewhat disappointing; it
seems that the characterization of normal traffic
varies from one FTP client to another, so the set
of traffic common across clients is very small.
HTTP
A coarse filter for sifting HTTP traffic sifts out all
GET or POST commands and responses with
length under 512 bytes. This filter sifts 98% of
HTTP traffic, removing 25,301 of 25,889 HTTP
packets seen during the two-day period. We did
not validate our assumption that packets smaller
than the triggering packet length are normal, so
this filter is of limited use in its present form.
AFS
We wrote a filter that captures all fragmented IP
packets and passes them to our tcpdump back-
end. As a simple application, we used this filter
to detect AFS servers sending packets larger than
the MTU of the destination host’s network.
EXPERIENCES
N-code has many powerful features not found in
other scripting languages, such as a list structure
and a foreach function to walk the elements of
a list This is very helpful in looking for one of a
group of items in a packet, perhaps comparing a
list of IP addresses to the packet’s address, or
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
† MACB is used to ask an FTP server to employ
the MacBinary protocol when transferring files.
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looking for a command in an FTP protocol
stream. Lists are also useful to store items cap-
tured out of a packet stream. Sparse arrays make
a convenient associative function for storing and
retrieving items.
N-code has functions for reading arbitrary bytes
of a packet, and logic functions for masking and
rotating those bytes. This makes it easy to exam-
ine fields of protocol headers, even those not
preconfigured into NFR. For example, fragment
bits of an IP header, not available as a builtin
variable in NFR, are easily recovered using
byte and logical functions.
The NFR architecture separates data selection
from backend reporting and processing functions.
This makes it possible to generate new backends
for novel purposes.
There are some syntactic weaknesses in the
language. A ":" not separated by spaces in a
timeout filter causes the engine to go into an
infinite loop, interpreting this as a request to read
the value of a variable from another file every 0
seconds. If the characters "_" or "-" are used in a
file name, the functions it contains cannot be
referenced from within another file, as these char-
acters collide with the N-code subtraction and
hierarchy operators.
Adding a selective branch construct to the N-code
language would greatly improve code complexity
and readability.
The decision to support implicitly declared vari-
ables in the N-code language caused us to expend
a considerable amount of debugging time, as
unreferenced variables caused by simple misspel-
ling of identifiers are difficult to find. Requiring
every variable to be declared would alleviate this
problem.
CONCLUSION
We found NFR and N-code to be powerful tools
for writing complex scripts for detecting known
attacks, and for writing sifters to help us in detect-
ing unknown attacks.
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2#This filter detects packets commonly used in a smurf attack by looking for any
3#icmp echo request packet sent to the broadcast address (any address ending in
4#255). This pattern can easily be changed to reflect the broadcast address on
5#your network, and this could also be altered to look for all traffic to the





11#Test to see if this packet is an ICMP echo request
12 if(icmp.type == 8)
13 {




18 echo ("Possible Smurf attack on ",ip.src, " Using ",








2#This filter detects attempts to connect to the sendmail port of any machine on your
3#network that is not a sendmail server. Could also easily be adapted to find other








12 if((!(ip.dest inside smtpservers))&&(ip.dest inside values:my_network))
13 {
14 {
15 echo("TCP connect to port 25(sendmail) attempted",

















33 echo("TCP connect to port 25(sendmail) established",





39 echo("TCP connect to port 25(sendmail) attempted",
















54 if((!(ip.dest inside smtpservers))&&(ip.dest inside values:my_network))
55 {
56 echo("UDP send to port 25(sendmail) attempted",









2#detects a specific named buffer overflow targetd at linux and freebsd platforms
3#This filter detects all TCP packets sent to a designated port, then searches them
4#for a specific string or attack signature. We must search for the string,
5#since it may be at many offsets within the packet depending on the version of the
6#program under attack. This filter is configured to detect a buffer overflow attack
7#on a named which runs under linux and freebsd. By changing the string definitions
8#and the port numbers below, this can be re-configured to detect other attacks.
9
10attack_name_linux="Linux named buffer overflow";
11attack_name_freebsd="FreeBSD named buffer overflow";
12
13attack_sig_linux0=blobbytes(0x31,0xc0,0xb0,0x3f,0x31,0xdb,0xb3);
























38 &&(index(tcp.blob,attack_sig_linux1)!= -1)) {










49 if( (index(tcp.blob,attack_sig_freebsd0)!= -1)
50 &&(index(tcp.blob,attack_sig_freebsd1)!= -1)) {











2#This filter detects a teardrop attack by re-assembling a fragmented packet
3#stream and checking for overlap of fragments within it. We keep an array
4#containing the source, destination, protocol, id, number of fragments
5#collected for that packet and the time a fragment was last received for each
6#fragment stream, and the length and offset of each fragment of each stream is
7#recorded in another array. Since the structure of a packet’s information is
8#a fixed length, we simply index into the array containing packet stream
9#information using an index multiplied by the structure’s length. We take
10#advantage of nfr’s support of a sparse address space to index streams of
11#fragments into the fragment array based on their index into the packet array
12#left shifted 14 bits. We multiply the fragment’s index into the array of
13#fragments for that fragment stream by the length of the fragment structure
14#and OR this with the left shifted index into the packet array to obtain the
15#index into the fragment array. This gives each packet a space for as many
16#fragments as are allowed in the offset field of an IP header. This also
17#leaves the potental for an overflow attack if over 2ˆ13 fragemnts of a
18#particular stream are directed at the filter.
19
20#Once these fragements are collected, a timeout trigger periodically sorts the
21#fragment array, then walks the sorted array and checks adjacent packets for
22#overlap. If overlap is found, it is reported. After a given pair of
23#packets is compared, the first one is marked as having been used in a
24#comparison, and if an overlap is found where both packets have already been
25#used in a comparison, this is not reported, because it was previously
26#reported. We currently only check linearly and do no checking within groups
27#of packets with the same offset, so some attack on the monitor is
28#possible here. Of course packets with the same offset overlap, so these are
29#reported. If the packet stream has not received a packet within a given
30#time period, it is deleted and the last packet stream in the array is moved
31#into its place.
32
33#Obviously this filter has an engine to collect and re-assemble packets, and
34#it could easily be modified to check for other anomylies between fragments




















53#we have a fragmented paket
54 if((($flags & 2)!=2)&&(!((($flags & 1)!=1)&&($offset==0))))
55 {
































88 if($inlist != 1)
89 {




































































156#********Do we also have to sort by length?













168 #echo("curoff",$curoff," prevoff",$prevoff," curlen",$curlen,




173#overlaping packets print src, dst, both offsets and lengths
174 {
175 echo(system.time,": Overlaping packet fragments detected ",
176 "from ",packlist[($index*pkt_struct_len)+1], " to ",
177 packlist[($index*pkt_struct_len)+2]," ID:",
178 packlist[$index*pkt_struct_len]," Protocol ",
179 packlist[($index*pkt_struct_len)+3],
























204#this will have to move the elements now


























































































































































































































































188 if((!($sport inside unknown_tcp))&&($sport<10000))
189 {
190 echo ("Unrecognized protocol in TCP header",




195 if((!($dport inside unknown_tcp))&&($dport<10000))
196 {
197 echo ("Unrecognized protocol in TCP header",
















































































































































336 if((!($sport inside unknown_udp))&&($sport<10000))
337 {
338 echo ("Unrecognized protocol in UDP header ",




343 if((!($dport inside unknown_udp))&&($dport<10000))
344 {
345 echo ("Unrecognized protocol in UDP header ",




















366 echo ("Unrecognized type in ICMP header ",$type,


























391 echo("smtp=",smtp," ftp=",ftp," telnet=",telnet," ssh=",ssh," http_t=",
392 http_t," http_u=",http_u," nntp=",nntp," ntp_t=",ntp_t," ntp_u=",










































2This backend logs packets sent to it one at a time to a tcpdump/pcap format file. It takes



































38 char * a,*b;
39 int size=1;
40 int * data_size;
41 int * type;
42 int a0;
43 char foo;
44 struct pcap_file_header hdr;










53 hdr.magic = TCPDUMP_MAGIC;
54 hdr.version_major = PCAP_VERSION_MAJOR;
55 hdr.version_minor = PCAP_VERSION_MINOR;
56 /*this should be set to the time zone*/
57 hdr.thiszone = -4;
58 hdr.snaplen = 1500;
59 hdr.sigfigs = 0;
60 /*this should be set to the real link type*/
61 hdr.linktype = DLT_EN10MB;
62























































116 printf("Read in file size=%xa[0-3]=%d %d %d %d0,size,a[0],a[1],a[2],a[3]);






















2This backend logs packets sent to it in blocks to a tcdump/pcap formant file. It takes
3as argument the file name to write to and expects input as produced by:
4$data_blob=blobbytes(NULL);
5#The next 2 statements are repeated to add packets to the block to be dumped(or discarded.)
6This scheme is useful for holding on to data that you might want to log but won’t know if



































42 char * a,*b;
43 int size=1;
44 int * data_size;





48 struct pcap_file_header hdr;








57 hdr.magic = TCPDUMP_MAGIC;
58 hdr.version_major = PCAP_VERSION_MAJOR;
59 hdr.version_minor = PCAP_VERSION_MINOR;
60 /*this should be set to the time zone*/
61 hdr.thiszone = -4;
62 hdr.snaplen = 1500;
63 hdr.sigfigs = 0;
64 /*this should be set to the real link type*/
65 hdr.linktype = DLT_EN10MB;
66













































































142 printf("Read in file size=%xa[0-3]=%d %d %d %d0,size,a[0],a[1],a[2
],a[3]);
























1#This is a filter to reject suspected good DNS packets and log all others to the file
rawbinary.bin. It does this with the help of the tcpdump format file writing backend, output.
Requests and replies for A, PTR and MX records are checked for names that are too long, names with
too many elements, and odd options or excessive numbers of records and if any of these conditions
are found, they are logged. All other DNS packets are also logged.
2
3
4#currently removes about 90%(62322 removed, 5385 logged) of the packet stream. Could do
better by applying some rules to eliminate known benign zone transfer and "all" transfer traffic,























26####this dose not currenty handle compressed names
27#this function takes the offset of a dns format name from the begining of the
28#data portion of the ip packet, and returns an array with element 0 a string
29#which is the name passed to it, and elemnt 1 being the length of the total

















































77filter dns_tcp tcp(port: 53)
78{
79# display("verbose");
80#we want to check for a query/response size larger than the given query or
81#response. It would involve a lot of overhead to check this on multiple




























































139 #record packet.blob to test_recorder;







147 if(header==1) #This assumes the query and first response are in order
148 {
149 echo("TCP DNS packet ",ip.src,":",tcp.sport,"->",ip.dst,":",tcp.dport," ID=",$id,"
Q/R=",$qr," Opcode=",$opcode," AA=",$aa," TC=",$tc," RD=",$rd," RA=",$ra," Z=",$z," RCODE=",$rcode,














160 if((!($qtype inside dns_types))||($qdcount!=1)||($y[2]!=0)||($qclass!=1)||(str
casecmp($opcode,"QUERY(0)"))||($y[1]>256))



























186filter dns_udp udp(port: 53)
187{
188 # echo(packet.sec," ",packet.usec," ",packet.len);
189 #record blobbytes(cat(123456),32,cat(packet.sec),32,cat(packet.usec),32,cat(packet.len),32
,blobbytes(packet.blob))





























217 if((!($qtype inside dns_types))||($qdcount!=1)||($y[2]!=0)||($qclass!=1)||(strcasecmp(
$opcode,"QUERY(0)"))||($y[1]>256)||($tc==1)||($z!=0)||(($rcode!=0)&&($rcode!=3))||($ancount>8)||($ns
count>8)||($arcount>8))







223 echo("UDP DNS packet ",ip.src,":",udp.sport,"->",ip.dst,":",udp.dport," ID=",$id,"
Q/R=",$qr," Opcode=",$opcode," AA=",$aa," TC=",$tc," RD=",$rd," RA=",$ra," Z=",$z," RCODE=",$rcode,











































258filter printit timeout(sec : 240,repeat)
259{
260#echo("total_qcounts=",total_qcounts,"0);





265filter garbcoll timeout(sec : 600,repeat)
266{
267 new_list=listadd(NULL);



















1#This filter discards suspected good control traffic on the FTP port, port 21, and logs all
other control packets to the file "ftp.tcpdump" in tcpdump format. All packets, including all
previous control packets on that connection, are logged to this file once a suspicious packet has
been detected. Additionally, the data on the port(s) of the data connection(s) for that control
stream are logged for all subsequent packets. This data is logged through the file "alldns.nfr"
to the log file "rawbinary.bin".
2
3#The command is parsed out and checked to see if it is a recognized command. The length of
the command is also checked to detect buffer overflow attacks. The arguments to some commands are
checked and the arguments to other commands are assumed to be harmless as long as they aren’t too
long. For example, any password is ok, but a user name of root, or a get of passwd is supicious.
When checking arguments, we check for cursor control characters, since these can be used to mask
a malicious command.
4
5#NOTE: This filter assumes that the packet variable tcp.nonce is unique. This is not
guaranteed but "likely" according to the documentation. If it is a counter, we should be ok.
If it is some sort of hash, we could be counting on uniqueness that does not exist in some cases.
6
7#Currently, we are removing about 40% of the packets from the control stream (690 packets
filtered 1052 packets logged 16778 data packets logged. We are not keeping enough state to
calculate the data packets removed). If we add some rules to sift out pasv commands from netscape
ftp streams, we can probably do better.
8
9#We have added a filter to remove the pasv traffic created by netscape, but it does allow a
potential attack by a client posing as a netscape client.
10
11#Also removing "MACB" command, now removes 80%(221 packets sifted, 53 packets logged, 0
associated data packets logged). A bug caused data packets to not be logged).
12


















29filter ftpclient tcp(client, dport : 21)
30{
31 declare $suspect_stream inside tcp.connSym;
32 declare $data_blob inside tcp.connSym;
33 declare $con_pkts inside tcp.connSym;
34 declare $pasv inside tcp.connSym;
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50#check to see if this is an abort(242) or status?, otherwise flag









60#we are checking for cursor control charechters that would let malicious
61#arguments otherwise pass through the detector

















79#test other commands that require argument testing or processing here












88 # echo ($a,"0);












































































































































225#parse stream and compare caommands,

















243filter ftpserver tcp(server, dport : 21)
244{
245 declare $suspect_stream inside tcp.connSym;
246 declare $data_blob inside tcp.connSym;
247 declare $con_pkts inside tcp.connSym;
248 declare $pssv inside tcp.connSym;
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281 declare $data_blob inside tcp.connSym;






288 declare $suspect_stream inside tcp.connSym;
289 declare $data_blob inside tcp.connSym;
290 declare $con_pkts inside tcp.connSym;
291 declare $pasv inside tcp.connSym;
292 declare $mozilla inside tcp.connSym;
293#note that this test opens up the server to attacks on the anonymous account(or any other
account that has been set to take mozilla as a password using the passive command. This may be










301 record $data_blob to test_recorder;
302 #echo("$data_blob=",$data_blob,"0);#/*



























330filter printit timeout(sec : 240,repeat)
331{
332echo("FTP: Packets Sifted=",packets_sifted," Packets Loged=", packets_loged,"(",(100*packets







1#This filter discards all HTTP traffic of type "get" or "post" that is under a given length
(512 bytes in this case). All other http packets are logged through alldns.nfr. This is a very










11 if (tcp.length > max_req_len)
12 {
13 #echo ("File too large");
14 bad=1;
15 }





















37filter printit timeout(sec : 240,repeat)
38{






1#This filter captures all fragmented IP packets and writes them to the file fragedPkts.pcap
using the special backend that writes to a pcap/tcpdump format file, output. I used this filter to

















16# echo("Begining of fragmented packet0);
17# display("verbose");
18# echo("End of fragmented packet0);
19
20 }
21
22}
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